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Abstract 
Private equity funds face an essential decision, when it comes to the divestment choice of a 
portfolio company. Using a sample of 237 private equity transactions in Germany between 
2000 and 2015, I observe that private equity funds take advantage of windows of opportunity 
being more likely to exit through an initial public offering (IPO) during ‘hot’ equity markets. 
Furthermore, secondary buyouts might be more resilient to rising interest rates rather than trade 
sales or IPOs. Due to the presence of more private equity capital in the market, funds tend to 
overpay for their targets, thereby, significantly increasing the volume of secondary buyouts. 
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I. Introduction and purpose of the project 
Nowadays, companies need to change the way they operate and enter new markets. In 
addition, they require access to finance, industry know-how, and managerial expertise. 
Adapting to a frequently changing macroeconomic environment has become more crucial than 
ever to enhancing productivity and competitiveness. 
Private equity is a form of equity investment made into companies which are not 
publicly traded, or alternatively, the private equity fund engages in the buyout of public 
companies resulting in the delisting of public equity. After the investment is made, private 
equity managers work alongside the company’s management to deliver operational 
improvement due to their industry and market expertise.1 
By addressing the challenges companies are facing and therefore playing an important 
role in the growth and recovery of the world’s economy, private equity has developed as an 
important field in academic research. However, Gompers (2001) and Lerner (2004) reveal that 
many questions about private equity remain unanswered. As a fact, private equity funds tend 
to avoid the public and to provide details about transactions as well as returns on their 
investments. This is a barrier to extensive quantitative research. Still, to date, research literature 
has elaborated on various aspects of private equity in detail, such as fundraising, investment 
determinants, value creation, pricing in buyouts etc., thereby, contributing to a more precise 
understanding of the private equity industry. Nevertheless, little academic attention has been 
given to the divestment stage of portfolio companies, the so-called exit phase. The investment 
of private equity funds is only held for a limited period, typically including a holding period 
around five years (Gompers et al., 2015). After this period, the private equity fund seeks the 
                                                     
1 Appendix A offers more details on the organisational structure for a private equity fund. 
  2 
exit of its investment – which implies either an initial public offering (“IPO”), a sale to another 
company (“trade sale”) or a sale to another private equity fund (“secondary buyout”). 
My objective in this working paper is to contribute to a more precise understanding of 
how and to what extent debt and equity market conditions affect the divestment choice of 
private equity funds. For this purpose, I construct a new dataset comprised of detailed 
information on 237 exits. The sample solely contains private equity divestments in mid-sized 
and large German companies – over EUR 50m in transaction value – which were sold between 
2000 and 2015. The private equity market in Germany is one of the most attractive in Europe, 
alongside that of the UK. The economy is strong, highly competitive and growing sustainably. 
Berlin, as the capital of Germany, is becoming increasingly an entrepreneurial hub globally 
and is therefore attracting additional investors, a fact that may also have been strengthened by 
recent events such as the imminent Brexit, which could lead to a decisive shift of private equity 
– especially venture capital – investors moving from London to Berlin. German companies 
enjoy an outstanding reputation for innovation, efficiency as well as for their highly-qualified 
employees.2, 3 In particular, small- and medium-sized enterprises – the so-called German 
Mittelstand – represent the anchor of the German economy, known and valued everywhere in 
the world. In comparison with other countries, Germany could overcome the financial and 
economic crisis very quickly, proving its positioning as a European growth engine, which was 
also reflected during the European sovereign debt crisis in the recent past.4 The fact that 
Germany has always provided and still provides investors with above-average growth 
opportunities is essential for the attractiveness and future of the private equity industry in 
Germany. 
                                                     
2 Brexit is an abbreviation for “British exit” which relates to the UK’s choice taken in a referendum on June 23, 
2016 to leave the European Union (EU). 
3 Venture capital is a type of private equity which focuses on small, early-stage and emerging companies. 
4 The European sovereign debt crisis arose at a time in which several European countries – such as Ireland, 
Greece, Spain, Portugal and Cyprus – were confronted with the collapse of financial institutions, high 
government debt and swiftly rising bond yield spreads in government securities. 
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I structured the remainder of this working paper as follows. In section II, I highlight 
and discuss major findings in academic research relating to the investor’s choice of divestment. 
Section III contains empirical analysis. I comment on the sample construction as well as on 
multiple sources of data, and I present a summary of statistics and regression results. Section 
IV concludes. 
II. Theoretical foundation and literature review 
In the past, several studies have been conducted with different focus on the analysis of 
private equity exits. Particular academic attention received the analysis of characteristics 
relating to corresponding exit routes as well as the analysis on exit timing and choice. 
Characteristics of exit routes 
When it comes to a portfolio company’s exit choice, the private equity fund faces an 
essential phase throughout the private equity cycle.5 There are three main exit routes – trade 
sale, secondary buyout and IPO – a private equity fund considers, among three additional 
routes which are less frequent. Each route has different implications and therefore requires 
particular attention. 
The most common private equity exit is the trade sale. In a trade sale, the portfolio 
company is sold to a third party, typically a strategic buyer. The strategic buyer operates in the 
same or related industry, and can be either vertically or horizontally integrated. Through the 
purchase of the target, it tries to expand into new markets and to gain access to products, 
technologies and technical know-how (Cumming and Macintosh, 2003a). Due to a strategic fit 
and potential synergies, it is a common perception that strategic buyers are willing to add a 
premium on the purchase price. However, this does not automatically imply that a strategic fit 
                                                     
5 The private equity cycle can be categorised into four different stages: I. Fundraising and creating the team (1 
to 2 years), II. Sourcing the deal flow (2 to 5 years), III. Managing and improving the portfolio (3 to 7 years) and 
IV. Exiting the investment (no specific time length). The overall timeframe of the private equity cycle varies from 
fund to fund. 
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and synergies are always present. In fact, Gompers and Lerner (2004) observe that there is a 
misalignment between the activities of the target company and the strategy of the buyer. 
Further, they show that strategic fit and potential synergies are more likely to be created when 
the buyer shows a strong strategic focus within its acquisition department, particularly in terms 
of integration of specific technologies into its existing product portfolio. According to 
Cumming and Macintosh (2003b), gains resulting from synergies are usually split between the 
buyer and seller throughout the negotiation process and are therefore reflected in the purchase 
price. Nonetheless, the negotiations might be also influenced by the respective bargaining 
power, the information available to both parties, and the extent to which the seller is aware of 
the size of potential synergy gains. 
In a secondary buyout, the company is sold to another financial sponsor. Financial 
sponsors seek good opportunities in which to invest, provide financial support using debt and 
equity, and exit in the short or medium term. Main characteristics for such investments are: 
strong cash flow generation, leading market positions, growth opportunities, efficiency 
enhancement opportunities, low capex requirements, strong asset base and a proven 
management team. Secondary buyouts are becoming more popular these days, evolving from 
a rarity in the 1990s amounting to 40 percent of private equity exits in recent years (Strömberg, 
2008). Many researchers analysed the phenomenon of secondary buyouts and the majority 
agrees that these deals do create significant value in the target companies, mainly thanks to 
high leverage as well as improved governance structures and operational enhancements 
(Kaplan, 1989 and Smith, 1990). However, they have been creating some controversy as well. 
Some commentators refer to these deals as “pass the parcel” deals, in which the aim of the 
transaction is simply “to spend capital and collect fees” (Degeorge et al., 2016) so that the final 
value of the company remains uncertain as long as it is moved from one fund to another. Once 
the company is sold to someone other than a financial sponsor, the music stops playing and its 
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true value is unveiled (Jenkinson and Sousa, 2015). This arises from the fact that private equity 
funds face a finite period in which they need to invest their capital. Considering that general 
partners (GPs) earn management fees on the capital invested, an agency conflict between GPs 
and limited partners (LPs) arises. When private equity funds are near to an investment cycle’s 
end and have enough cash available, the GPs are incentivised to take bad deals and burn money. 
In that case, secondary buyouts represent a good opportunity because of significantly lower 
search costs and lower adverse selection problems, as compared with other buyouts (Axelson 
et. al., 2013).6, 7 Another concern about secondary buyouts is what added value, if any, such a 
transaction might have for the portfolio company compared with the first private equity fund. 
Assuming the buyer offers a complementary skill set to the seller’s, an increase in the value of 
the portfolio company might be achieved. Degeorge et al. (2016) investigate the creation of 
added value using a dataset of 2,137 companies from 121 private equity firms. They reveal that 
additional value is created when two private equity funds differ either in investment thesis, in 
geographic dispersion (e.g. global vs. regional fund), or in educational background and careers 
paths of its employees. Finally, there is a widespread conflict commonly known as LP 
overlapping. This situation occurs when the LPs in private equity funds are present not only on 
the buying side of the transaction, but also on the selling side. As a result, the LPs are left 
owning the same asset after the transaction, but paying high transaction costs. Degeorge et al. 
(2016) consider this view as incorrect when reassessing the various skill set of private equity 
funds. Assuming that GPs do not return any capital to the investors at any point in time – an 
assumption which is nearly always given in practice – LPs profit from the transaction when 
                                                     
6 Companies which are owned by private equities are publicly known and therefore, lead to lower search costs. 
7 The adverse selection problem is defined as the risk of having asymmetric information between the buyer and 
the seller. If the seller is part of a private equity portfolio, this company is generally open to acquisition and 
therefore, the risk of adverse selection problems is mitigated. 
  6 
being on both the buying and selling side, provided that they invested in funds with 
complementary skills. 
In an IPO, a company’s shares are sold to public investors, which usually results in the 
listing of the company on a stock exchange. There are many advantages associated with a 
company going public. Initially, the IPO represents a massive opportunity for a company to be 
provided with a significant infusion of fresh capital. This might be useful for research and 
development, or even for paying off existing debt. Another advantage is the creation of public 
awareness. The company can profit from the publicity by marketing its products and extending 
its current customer base, thereby address new customer groups. However, at the time of an 
IPO, not all the private equity’s shares are immediately disposed to the public market. Rather 
the private equity will be subject to a lock-up agreement with the investment bank which is 
underwriting the offering.8 It is in the best interest of both parties – the private equity and the 
underwriter – that the shares not be sold immediately after the offering. The immediate sale of 
shares could trigger a perception to the public that the investors have serious doubts about the 
prosperity of the company and that the share price might be overvalued (Povaly, 2007). 
Additionally, public investors would not benefit from the continued supervision of the 
management by the private equity if it leaves right after the IPO (Cumming and Macintosh, 
2003b). Typically, the lock-up comprises a period of 6 to 12 months in which the private equity 
is not allowed to sell its shares to the public market (Gompers and Lerner, 1998). Following 
this period, securities are either sold to the public or distributed to other investors over months 
or even years after the offering. Leschke (2003) also states that a successful IPO exit requires 
thoughtful planning, an intense due diligence process as well as extensive preparation work, 
                                                     
8 Underwriting is defined as a process in which investment banks raise capital from investors on behalf of 
companies and governments that are issuing equity or debt securities. 
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and a lot of time by the management. Additionally, there are high transaction costs which must 
be considered when executing an offering. These can include costs such as: 
 the underwriter’s commission 
 accounting costs to prepare the company for public market reporting standards 
 legal, accounting and other costs relating to the production of registration statements 
and other documents which are required by securities regulators 
 listing fees that are charged by stock exchanges 
All the costs associated with an IPO might take up to 20% of the offering’s proceeds resulting 
in a highly expensive exit strategy for a private equity fund (Povaly, 2007). 
Lastly, there are additional three exit strategies – buy-backs, recapitalisations, and write-offs / 
write-downs – which are less frequent and therefore, do not receive much academic attention. 
In a buy-back, the stake of the private equity is sold back to the company or the entrepreneur 
that sold its shares in the first place. To finance a buy-back, the company or the entrepreneur 
need to borrow a substantial amount of capital, leading to high fixed interest payments as well 
as principals which can rarely be fully paid. As a result, companies and entrepreneurs often 
might not have the resources to perform a full buyout (Cumming and Macintosh, 2003a). A 
recapitalisation cannot be fully considered as a true form of exit, as it does not reduce the stake 
of the private equity within a company. In fact, it is a means of extracting cash from a company 
without even selling it. Usually, money is raised by borrowing from a bank or issuing bonds to 
repurchase the company’s own shares from its investors. In this way, current investors remain 
in control of the company while receiving cash payments and potential tax benefits. On the 
other hand, the amount of additional debt taken on might bring the company into financial 
distress and restrict the flexibility of the company in its operations. In a write-off, the private 
equity is not able to realise its initially expected returns and liquidates its investment. In some 
cases, the investor might keep holding its shares in the company if its investment is marginally 
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profitable (Cumming and Macintosh, 2003b). A write-down involves a form of value 
correction, in which initial upside potentials are not met but there is still some value left in the 
investment. In the private equity jargon, companies connected with a write-off or a write-down 
are tagged “as ‘living dead’ or ‘walking wounded’ investments” (Povaly, 2007). 
In short, IPOs are often described as successful exits within academic research. 
However, these exits do not lead to quick, or definite gains as the private equity funds will be 
subject to a lock-up agreement of 6 to 12 months. Secondary buyouts are quick to execute and 
provide certain proceeds. Unlike trade sales where competitors are not the most improbable 
buyers, secondary buyouts are also involved in less regulatory issues. As a result, IPOs are 
relatively uncommon with most of private equity exits being either trade sales or secondary 
buyouts. 
Exit timing and choice 
Particular effort is made in the research of determining the optimal point to divest a 
portfolio company. Subsequently, I present various approaches, assumptions and major 
findings. 
Most recent research on the exit timing and choice is conducted by Jenkinson and Sousa 
(2015) based on 1022 self-collected European private equity divestments. They examine exit 
determinants for leveraged buyouts by analysing three major impacts – market conditions, 
portfolio company characteristics and fund characteristics – on the exit choice. They find that 
the exit choice is primarily influenced by capital market conditions. Private equity funds make 
use of so-called windows of opportunity which are only present at some specific points in time. 
Another phenomenon can be observed during 2006 and 2007. Due to extraordinary conditions 
in the credit market, European buyouts were able to use higher levels of debt. In line with an 
increase of committed capital by LPs, private equities could afford to pay significant premia 
on top of transaction prices, and thereby, increase the proportion of secondary buyouts as 
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compared with trade sales. In terms of the impact of portfolio company characteristics and fund 
characteristics on the choice of divestment route, they conclude that secondary buyouts are 
more likely to take place when the portfolio company has a strong cash flow generation and 
requires lower capital expenditures. Also, private equity funds which have more experience 
tend selling to funds with less experience. 
Wang (2012) studies the economic logic and pricing of secondary buyouts, particularly 
investigating the liquidity-based market timing as potential explanation for secondary buyouts. 
Like Jenkinson and Sousa (2015), she observes that secondary buyouts are more likely to be 
chosen during “cold” equity market periods,9 favourable debt market conditions, and when 
selling private equity fund is facing liquidity constraints. For her analysis, she uses a hand-
collected dataset comprising a total of 485 secondary buyouts in the UK between 1997 and 
2008. 
Axelson et al. (2013) are not directly involved in the analysis of exit timing and choice. 
Rather, they analyse the determinants of leverage and pricing using a dataset of secondary 
buyouts between 1980 and 2008. They find that leverage in secondary buyouts is primarily 
driven by economy-wide debt market conditions. Consequently, due to higher leverage used in 
transactions, an increase in transaction prices and a decrease in secondary buyout fund returns 
can be observed, assuming that buyers pay significant premia during favourable debt market 
conditions. Jenkinson and Sousa (2015) also suggest this. 
Degeorge et al. (2016) primarily focus on value creation within private equity 
transactions. However, they raise some points which relate to the exit of secondary buyouts in 
a broad sense. They find that secondary buyouts which take place close to the end of a fund’s 
lifecycle underperform other secondary buyouts significantly. Within their working paper, they 
                                                     
9 A “cold equity” market is characterised by unfavourable equity market conditions, i.e. low or negative stock 
market returns. 
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also refer to a related study conducted by Arcot et al. (2013). They analyse the rationale and 
determinants of secondary buyouts using a dataset of 4,328 private equity divestments – 
including 1,274 secondary buyouts – within the US and 12 European countries between 1980 
and 2015. They find that secondary buyouts are more likely to take place when either the 
buying or selling private equity fund is pressured to invest or exit. As a proxy for the transaction 
pressure they use the distance to the end of a fund lifecycle, its level of inactivity as well as its 
reputation. Moreover, they observe that buyers under pressure are also more likely to overpay 
for secondary buyouts, while sellers under pressure are more likely to agree to lower 
transaction prices for their portfolio companies. 
Overall, several observations are raised with respect to the exit timing and choice of 
private equity funds. It is shown that especially macroeconomic effects, i.e. capital market 
conditions, play a significant role when it comes to a portfolio company’s exit. Subsequently, 
I investigate major findings relating to a macroeconomic impact within the empirical analysis 
of this working paper. 
III. Empirical analysis 
When conducting academic research around private equity one of the main limitations 
is the lack of data. As I mention earlier, private equity funds tend to avoid the public and to 
provide details about transactions as well as returns on their investments. This is a barrier to 
extensive quantitative research. Therefore, the focus is set on an analysis from a 
macroeconomic perspective, and, more specifically, on the impact of debt and equity market 
conditions on private equity fund’s exit choices between 2000 and 2015. Additionally, I 
consider whether liquidity constraints of the seller play a significant role within the divestment 
of portfolio companies. 
First, I provide information relating to the sample construction, tested decision factors 
and hypotheses. Further, I show initial summary results based solely on descriptive statistics. 
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Finally, I test the likelihood of the three main divestment choices using a trinomial logit model 
and I summarise the respective regression results. 
Sample construction, tested decision factors and hypotheses 
I construct the sample by using various sources and databases. As initial step, I 
primarily collect private equity divestments between 2000 and 2015 from Bloomberg, 
Thomson Reuters Eikon and individual research. Decisive for being part of the sample is the 
German headquarters of the portfolio company while the private equity funds themselves are 
globally active, and therefore not restricted to a specific regional area. More importantly, this 
hand-collected dataset allows me to analyse each private equity divestment individually and to 
evaluate different ownership structures within a portfolio company. For analysis purposes, I 
only consider deals with majority shareholding by the private equity funds, under the 
assumption that the exit choice is not primarily influenced by another shareholder. In total, I 
identify 237 private equity exits between 2000 and 2015. Among these, there are 120 trade 
sales, 92 secondary buyouts and 25 IPOs. Figure 1 illustrates the exit distribution by the 
respective choice and year. 
 
Figure 1: Exit distribution by choice and year 
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As a next step, I gather data relating to macroeconomic conditions – in particular, the 
equity and debt market. 
Equity market conditions are characterised by using indicators such as the local stock 
market return and IPO volume which I retrieve from Bloomberg and relevant German stock 
exchange websites. The stock market return is expressed as the yearly average return – in 
percent – of the DAX index at the time the divestment of the portfolio company is made.10 De 
Bondt and Thaler (1985) find that stocks with high average returns over past periods do show 
lower returns over following periods. However, it is a common perception of many investors 
that recent stock returns are a good approximation of future stock returns (Barberis et al., 2016). 
Furthermore, my approach of using the local stock market return as an indicator for the state 
of the equity market is consistent with Jenkinson and Sousa (2015), except for the fact that they 
consider the average return between six and three months before the exit. Another variable is 
the IPO volume. Wang (2012) chooses the industry IPO volume to proxy the state of the equity 
market in the UK. She assumes that a high number of IPOs stands for a healthy equity market 
environment. In this working paper, the IPO volume includes the IPOs across all industries in 
Germany at the year of the exit by the private equity fund. Both variables reflect the health of 
the German equity market, and are primarily used to investigate the existence of windows of 
opportunity that private equity funds try to exploit by exiting through an IPO. This said, I 
formulate the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis A: 
During a healthy stock market environment, an IPO’s divestment choice is more likely to be 
compared with secondary buyouts. 
Debt market conditions are described by the European Central Bank (ECB) interest rate 
as well as the high-yield loan volume in Western Europe. The ECB provides detailed 
                                                     
10 For analysis purposes, the yearly average stock market return is multiplied by 100. 
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information about official interest rates on its homepage, while high-yield loan volumes are 
retrieved from Thomson Reuter Eikon’s platform. The ECB interest rate represents the rate on 
the marginal lending facility which is selected when banks from the Eurosystem are provided 
with overnight credit. This is expressed as a yearly average percentage.11 By using the high-
yield loan volume in Western Europe in the year of the divestment as an additional variable, I 
follow the approach of Wang (2012). She supposes that the size of the loan market has a 
positive impact on the probability of choosing secondary buyouts as a preferred exit choice. 
Both variables are used to display the cost of borrowing and the availability of debt in the 
market, respectively. It is widely spread that the boom of secondary buyouts between 2003 and 
2007 was largely fuelled by favourable debt conditions, i.e. high availability of debt, cheap 
debt, convenient loan terms and weak covenants. With respect to the likelihood of secondary 
buyouts occurring, I test whether favourable debt market conditions indeed affect secondary 
buyouts as a preferred exit choice. Therefore, I make the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis B: 
The cheaper the debt and the more debt is available, the more likely a secondary buyout will 
be performed compared with trade sales and IPOs. 
As a final indicator, I select the committed capital index return,12 which I extract from 
Preqin, a leading database for the alternative assets. The committed capital index reflects the 
amount of capital which is invested in private equity funds, indicating the health of the private 
equity industry. Like the local stock market return, it is calculated as the yearly average – in 
percent – at the time of the exit by the private equity fund.13 Between 2006 and 2007, there is 
a spike in secondary buyouts. Many authors and practitioners claim that increased amounts in 
                                                     
11 For analysis purposes, the yearly average ECB interest rate is multiplied by 100. 
12 Committed capital is the capital amount raised by the private equity from its investors, and comprises un-called 
as well as called capital. Un-called capital is often invested into risk-free instruments (e.g. treasury bills) for 
growing purposes while called capital is defined as the capital which is distributed back to the investors. 
13 For analysis purposes, the yearly average committed capital index return is multiplied by 100. 
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committed capital contributed to this phenomenon, as private equity funds could afford to pay 
excessive premia on top of transaction prices, and therefore increasing the proportion of 
secondary buyouts compared with trade sales. This said, I examine the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis C: 
A high committed capital index return makes secondary buyouts more likely compared with 
trade sales and IPOs. 
Summary statistics 
Table 1 provides summary information for each divestment subsample, including a total 
of 237 private equity transactions from 2000 to 2015. Further, I differentiate between three 
panels. 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 1: Descriptive statistics – summary for each divestment subsample 
Panel A describes the equity market conditions which include the local stock market 
and IPO volume as indicators. I observe that IPOs tend to be chosen as a preferred exit route 
when the local stock market is particularly strong. On average, the market return holds 1.19 
percent when this divestment strategy is selected. With respect to the existence of windows of 
opportunity, it is clear that private equity funds do take advantage of a certain momentum 
within the equity market, as suggested by Jenkinson and Sousa (2015). 
Panel B displays the debt market environment which is characterised by the ECB 
interest rate and the high-yield loan volume in Western Europe. The results show that the 
average and median ECB interest rate is slightly higher for secondary buyouts compared with 
trade sales and IPOs, suggesting that secondary buyouts might be less prone to rising interest 
Average Median Average Median Average Median
Panel A: Equity market conditions
Local stock market return (in %) 0.29 0.24 0.47 0.44 1.19 1.23
IPO volume (in #) 12.94 12.00 14.68 12.00 17.48 12.00
Panel B: Debt market conditions
ECB interest rate (in %) 1.82 1.28 2.03 2.00 1.27 1.00
High-yield loan volume (in € bn) 162.11 128.77 174.31 128.77 162.23 179.63
Panel C: Other conditions
Capital committed index return (in %) 1.99 2.13 2.30 3.02 2.13 2.13
Variables IPOSecondary buyoutTrade sale
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rates than the other divestment choices. 
Panel C represents the committed capital index return which is a proxy for the health 
of the private equity industry. As expected, the average and the median committed capital index 
return are the highest for secondary buyouts, meaning that secondary buyouts are a preferred 
exit choice when there is a rise in capital within the private equity industry. Due to the presence 
of more capital, private equity funds are more likely to overpay for their target companies, 
thereby, increasing the volume of secondary buyouts significantly as it is observed between 
2006 and 2007. 
Trinomial logit model and regression results 
In this section, I use a trinomial logit model to analyse the likelihood of one divestment 
strategy being chosen over another, given a specific set of macroeconomic factors. 
The dependent variable 𝑦 is a categorical, unordered variable where one outcome can 
be selected among a number of 𝑗 alternatives denoted as 𝑗 = 0, 1, 2, … , 𝑛. Considering that 
these numbers are only used for coding purposes, their magnitude cannot be interpreted. In this 
case, the dependent variable represents the respective divestment strategy. There are three 
possible outcomes which are coded as follows: 0 for trade sales, 1 for secondary buyouts and 
2 for IPOs. As independent variables, I select the five aforementioned indicators – local stock 
market return, IPO volume, ECB interest rate, high-yield loan volume and capital committed 
index return – to describe the divestment choice.  
Table 2 provides the regression results for four trinomial logit models using secondary 
buyouts as base outcome. The standard errors of the coefficients are shown in parenthesis. 
Models 1 to 3 do only consider the individual panels A, B and C which are already described 
within the summary statistics. Model 4 includes all five independent variables. 
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Table 2: Trinomial logit model – regression results using secondary buyouts as base outcome 
The regression results of the models 1 to 3 suggest that IPOs are more likely to be 
chosen as divestment strategy by private equity funds relative to the reference group of 
secondary buyouts when local stock market returns are high. Jenkinson and Sousa (2015) 
elaborate on windows of opportunity, which are only present at some specific points in time. 
During ‘hot’ equity market periods, private equity funds do take advantage of a certain 
momentum, leading to a significant increase in IPO activity. This is also in line with the results 
of descriptive statistics. When evaluating the results of equity market conditions with 
hypothesis A, I can confirm that an IPO’s divestment choice is more likely during a healthy 
stock market environment, as compared with secondary buyouts. 
Furthermore, I observe that IPOs are less likely to occur as compared with secondary 
buyouts when ECB interest rates are high. As I suggest earlier, this might indicate that 
secondary buyouts are less prone to rising interest rates than IPOs. The same conclusion holds 
for trade sales as compared with secondary buyouts. However, the latter shows no statistical 
significance, so it comes more from economic importance. In this working paper, I do refrain 
from making any final conclusions at this point, as this observation requires further research. 
Therefore, I cannot verify hypothesis B that secondary buyouts are more likely to exit during 
favourable debt market conditions relative to trade sales and IPOs. 
Trade sale IPO Trade sale IPO Trade sale IPO Trade sale IPO
Panel A: Equity market conditions
Local stock market return -0.063 0.402** -0.118 0.638**
(0.084) (0.191) (0.145) (0.267)
IPO volume -0.007 0.009 -0.001 0.023*
(0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.013)
Panel B: Debt market conditions
ECB interest rate -0.080 -0.443** -0.148 -0.491*
(0.109) (0.191) (0.133) (0.281)
High-yield loan volume -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.003
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004)
Panel C: Other conditions
Capital committed index return -0.072 -0.040 0.010 -0.379
(0.067) (0.109) (0.113) (0.271)
Observations
LR Chi squared
Pseudo R squared
Note:
* indicates a significance level of 10%
** indicates a significance level of 5%
*** indicates a significance level of 1%
20.50**
237
0.046
237
1.16
0.003
237
7.05
0.016
237
9.16*
0.020
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
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Another variable which might be from economic importance is the capital commitment 
index return. Model 3 indicates that not only trade sales but also IPOs are less likely to be 
selected as compared with secondary when the capital commitment index return is high. Due 
to more capital, private equity funds are more likely to overpay for their target companies and 
therefore, increasing the volume of secondary buyouts significantly. Therefore, investigating 
hypothesis C from an economic perspective I observe that a high capital commitment index 
return makes secondary buyouts more likely to take place relative to trade sales and IPOs. 
However, I would like to point out that there is no statistical significance relating to this finding. 
Model 4 confirms the precedent regression results from the models 1 to 3. An additional 
observation which must be stressed is the statistical significance of IPO volume. Consistent 
with the effect of the local stock market return, IPOs are more likely to be selected as exit 
strategies, relative to secondary buyouts when IPO volume is high, suggesting the existence of 
windows of opportunity. 
Since the coefficients of the trinomial logit model merely provide an indication relating 
to the direction of the likelihood and do not draw any conclusions with respect to its magnitude, 
an analysis of relative risk ratios (RRRs) and marginal effects at its mean (MEM) is considered. 
For further analysis purposes, I do only use model 4. 
When exponentiating the coefficients of model 4 I obtain the respective RRRs. The 
RRR measures the risk for an event occurring over another, i.e. trade sales over secondary 
buyouts as well as IPOs over secondary buyouts. If the RRR is above 1 it can be concluded 
that the independent variable increases the probability of selecting the alternative outcome over 
the base outcome. If the RRR is below 1, then, the independent variable decreases the 
probability to choose the alternative outcome over the base outcome. Table 3 provides 
information on the RRRs of the trinomial logit model. 
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Table 3: Trinomial logit model – RRRs of model 4 using all independent variables 
According to the RRRs, I observe that local stock market return, IPO volume and ECB 
interest rate provide statistically significant results at 10, 5 and 5 percent, respectively, when 
comparing IPOs relative to secondary buyouts. 
These conclusions are based on the ceteris paribus assumption, i.e. keeping all other 
variables constant. If the local stock market return increases by one unit (corresponding to one 
percent), a private equity fund is 1.892 times more likely to exit through an IPO over a 
secondary buyout. A similar observation holds for IPO volume. If the IPO volume increases 
by one unit (corresponding to an additional IPO exit), a private equity fund is 1.023 times more 
likely to exit through an IPO over a secondary buyout. In terms of debt market conditions, I 
find that if the ECB interest rate rises by one unit (corresponding to one percent), a private 
equity fund’s exit through an IPO is 0.612 times more likely over a secondary buyout. 
Another observation relates to the RRR of the ECB interest rate for trade sales 
compared with secondary buyouts. Even though this ratio does not provide any statistical 
significance, it might be from economic importance due to its high RRR. Keeping all other 
variables constant, if the ECB interest rate increases by one unit (corresponding to one percent), 
the private equity fund is 0.863 times more likely to exit through a trade sale over a secondary 
buyout. 
RRR Std. Err. RRR Std. Err.
Panel A: Equity market conditions
Local stock market return 0.888 0.128 1.892** 0.504
IPO volume 0.999 0.011 1.023* 0.013
Panel B: Debt market conditions
ECB interest rate 0.863 0.115 0.612* 0.172
High-yield loan volume 0.999 0.002 1.003 0.004
Panel C: Other conditions
Capital committed index return 1.010 0.114 0.684 0.186
Note:
* indicates a significance level of 10%
** indicates a significance level of 5%
*** indicates a significance level of 1%
Variables Trade sale IPO
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As alternative approach to understanding the magnitude of the trinomial logit model, 
the analysis of marginal effects can be used. The marginal effect describes the change in 
probability of choosing an outcome 𝑗 if the independent variable increases by one unit. In this 
case, I use MEM to measure how probabilities change as a response to a typical change in the 
respective variable of interest. The MEM is computed by setting the values of all explanatory 
variables to their respective means within the sample. Table 4 provides the marginal effects for 
the trinomial logit model. 
Table 4: Trinomial logit model – MEM of model 4 using all independent variables 
I find that when the local stock market return increases by one unit (corresponding to 
one percent), the probability of selecting trade sale as divestment choice decreases by 5.4 
percent. However, there is no statistical significance. This observation is rather from economic 
importance due to its high MEM. A reverse effect is apparent in the case of IPOs. With a unit 
increase (corresponding to one percent) in local stock market return, the probability of choosing 
IPO as divestment strategy increases by 4.7 percent. Also, if the IPO volume increases by one 
unit (corresponding to an additional IPO exit), the average probability of selecting an IPO 
increases by 0.2 percent. In terms of debt market conditions, I find that when the ECB interest 
rate increases by one unit (corresponding to one percent), the probability of choosing IPO as 
divestment choice decreases by 2.7 percent. Another observation refers to capital commitment 
index return. Even though it does not provide any statistical significance, it might be 
Mean
dy/dx Std. Err. dy/dx Std. Err. dy/dx Std. Err.
Panel A: Equity market conditions
Local stock market return 0.453 -0.054 0.034 0.006 0.034 0.047*** 0.016
IPO volume 14.097 -0.001 0.002 -0.000 0.002 0.002** 0.001
Panel B: Debt market conditions
ECB interest rate 1.841 -0.018 0.031 0.046 0.031 -0.027* 0.016
High-yield loan volume 166.863 -0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000
Panel C: Other conditions
Capital committed index return 2.124 0.017 0.028 0.009 0.027 -0.026 0.019
Note:
* indicates a significance level of 10%
** indicates a significance level of 5%
*** indicates a significance level of 1%
Variables Trade sale (p = 0.526) Secondary buyout (p = 0.402) IPO (p = 0.072) 
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economically important due to its high MEM. I notice that if the capital commitment index 
return increases by one unit (corresponding to one percent), the probability of selecting IPO as 
divestment choice decreases by 2.6 percent. 
In summary, the results show that private equity funds tend to take advantage of 
windows of opportunity being more likely to select IPOs as preferred exit route. When it comes 
to the impact of debt market conditions on an exit route’s probability, it is apparent that IPOs 
and trade sales are less likely to take place, as compared with secondary buyouts when debt is 
expensive, which in turn indicates that secondary buyouts might be more resilient to rising 
interest rates. However, further research is required to confirm this assumption. From an 
economic perspective, I do also notice that IPOs are less likely to be selected, as compared 
with secondary buyouts when the capital commitment index return is high. Due to more capital 
in the market private equity funds tend to overpay for their target companies and therefore, 
increasing the volume of secondary buyouts significantly. 
IV. Conclusion 
Over the past five years, the number of private equity transactions – mainly the 
proportion of secondary buyouts – has been increasing significantly, and has therefore been 
playing a major role in the growth and recovery of the world’s economy. Particular attention 
has received the private equity industry in Germany, where transactions have been constantly 
growing with a compounded annual growth rate (CAGR) of 19.7 percent from 2012 to 2015. 
To date, many studies have been elaborating on various aspects of private equity in detail, such 
as fundraising, investment determinants and value creation, though little academic attention 
has been given to the divestment stage of portfolio companies. Using a sample of 237 private 
equity transactions in Germany between 2000 and 2015, the objective of this working paper is 
to contribute to a more precise understanding of how and to what extent debt and equity market 
conditions affect the private equity fund’s divestment choice. 
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The results show that the exit choice is strongly affected by the macroeconomic 
environment that private equities are facing, as suggested by Axelson et al. (2013) and 
Jenkinson and Sousa (2015). I observe that private equity funds do take advantage of windows 
of opportunity. During favourable equity market conditions, they tend to use the momentum, 
and are more likely to exit their investment in a portfolio company through an IPO, relative to 
a secondary buyout. As for the impact of debt market conditions, I notice that IPOs and trade 
sales are less likely to be used as divestment strategies relative to secondary buyouts when debt 
is expensive. This observation indicates that secondary buyouts might be more resilient to 
rising interest rates when compared with the alternative exit choices. However, more research 
needs to be done. 
Lastly, an economic emphasis is placed on the impact of the capital commitment index 
return. IPOs are less likely to be chosen as a divestment strategy relative to secondary buyouts 
when the capital commitment index return is high. Due to the presence of more capital in the 
market, private equity funds tend to overpay for their target companies and therefore increase 
the volume of secondary buyouts significantly. 
When comparing the results of this working paper with previous studies, I find many 
similarities while using a different sample of transactions. Instead of focusing on a cross section 
of countries, as Wang (2012), Axelson et al. (2013) and Jenkinson and Sousa (2015) do, I 
analyse the private equity industry in Germany. This allows me to make a significant academic 
contribution on the basis of a specific country. I observe that the divestment choices of private 
equity funds are strongly affected by their macroeconomic environments. 
In research literature, IPOs are often described as successful exits. However, these exits 
do not lead to quick or definite gains, as the private equity funds will be subject to a lock-up 
agreement of 6 to 12 months. Secondary buyouts are quick to execute and provide certain 
proceeds. Unlike trade sales where competitors are not the most improbable buyers, secondary 
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buyouts are also involved in less regulatory issues. As a result, IPOs are relatively uncommon, 
and most of private equity exits are either trade sales or secondary buyouts. 
Concluding this working paper with an outlook toward Germany’s private equity 
industry, the market appears to be bullish, with an upward trend from 2012 onwards. 
Favourable financial conditions and a major deterioration in political stability primarily due to 
the Brexit may benefit the private equity industry in Germany, leading to continuous growth 
in transactions and highlighting the importance of understanding the impact on private equity 
funds’ divestment choices. 
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Appendix A 
Typical organisational structure for a private equity fund 
 
 
Source: Own illustration based on Schwarz and Weinstein (1989), and Badertscher et al. (2010) 
 
 
Exit distribution by choice and year 
 
Note: The table comprises the exit distribution by choice and year with the corresponding independent variables which are 
used within the trinomial logit model. Please consider that all five independent variables are expressed on a yearly basis. 
 
Source: Own sample construction using Bloomberg, Thomson Reuters Eikon and individual research. 
 
Private equity firm
(general partners)
Investors
(limited partners)
Private equity 
investment fund
Portfolio 
company II
Portfolio 
company I
Portfolio 
company III
Deal structure
Debt financing makes up
around 80% of the entire
transaction price the private
equity investment fund pays
for a portfolio company. In
turn, debt lenders receive
part of the target‘s future
cash flows as well as
securities over tangible
assets.
5 to 10 % 90 to 95 %
Minority equity 
ownership
Majority equity 
ownership
Management fees, 
plus
80 % of gain on the exit 
of the portfolio company
carried interest –
20 % of gain on the exit of 
the portfolio company
Public pension funds, corporate
pension funds, insurance companies,
high-net-worth individuals, family
offices foundations, etc.
Year Exits Trade sales
Secondary 
buyouts IPOs
Local stock 
market
IPO 
volume
ECB 
interest 
rates
High yield 
loan market 
size
Committed 
capital 
index
2000 3 1 1 1 0.11 142.00 3.99 91.08 0.80
2001 2 1 1 0 -2.05 21.00 4.29 63.94 -0.58
2002 3 3 0 0 -4.47 7.00 3.22 77.50 0.54
2003 3 0 3 0 3.60 0.00 2.26 101.95 3.39
2004 19 9 9 1 0.44 4.00 2.00 102.56 4.02
2005 19 12 3 4 2.48 13.00 2.02 179.63 3.02
2006 17 4 10 3 1.54 32.00 2.76 247.75 3.87
2007 33 17 16 0 0.24 25.00 3.84 324.31 4.40
2008 18 10 8 0 -3.55 2.00 3.90 112.09 -3.64
2009 5 4 1 0 2.43 1.00 1.28 57.02 1.81
2010 13 5 4 4 2.02 6.00 1.00 86.01 2.13
2011 27 15 9 3 -0.45 12.00 1.25 100.55 1.08
2012 14 8 6 0 1.62 8.00 0.88 94.91 2.50
2013 17 9 7 1 1.56 5.00 0.55 128.77 3.62
2014 20 7 7 6 1.23 8.00 0.16 208.34 1.24
2015 24 15 7 2 -0.51 15.00 0.05 187.97 1.00
